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June 1969] KISTLER V. V ASl 261 
[71 C.2d 281; 78 Cal.Rptr. 170,455 P.2d 106] 
[L. A. No. 29626. In Bank. June 18, 1969.] 
ART C. KISTLER et aI., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. 
ANTHONY D. V ASI et aI., Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Trust Deeds-Sale Under Power-Deficiency-Application of 
Statutes.-Recovery of the balance due on a promissory note 
secured by a second deed of trust on real property, the security 
having been exhausted by a sale under the first deed of trust, 
was not barred by the antideficiency provisions of Code Civ. 
Proc., § 580b, where the note was accepted by plaintiff real 
estate brokers in lieu of cash payment of the commission due 
from one of the parties to a real estate exchange, where defend-
ants, by giving such note, in effect borrowed from plaintiffs 
a part of the cash difference they owed in connection with 
the exchange, thereby reducing their obligation to the other 
parties to the exchange, where the property involved was 
unimproved commercial property, and where, under the plain 
language of the statute, plaintiffs were lenders, not vendors. 
[2] Id.-Sale Under Power-Deficiency-Applica.tion of Statutes. 
-The 1963 amendment to Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, expressly 
distinguishes between lenders of purchase money and vendors 
and contemplates that the parties to a sale of real property, 
other than residential property as defined in the statute, may 
freely elect to arrange for the financing of the purchase price 
in ways that may wholly or in part limit the vendees's pro-
tection from deficiency judgments . 
.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. Herbert S. Herlands, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to recover the balance due on a promissory note. 
Summary judgment for defendant reversed. 
Hurwitz, Hurwitz & Remer, Robert R. Hurwitz and James 
B. MacDonald for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Jordan, Dodge & Loveridge, Dodge & Loveridge, Paul F. 
Loveridge, Henry Hill, Vaverka & Price and Donald R. Price 
for Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds, § 472. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Trust Deeds, § 95(2)(a). 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment 'f( 
defendants in an action to recover the balance due on 
promissory note. The note was secured by a second deed ( 
trust on real property, but the security had been exhausted 11 
a sale under the first deed of trust. The trial court grant€ 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the groUD 
that the undisputed facts established that Code of Civil Prl 
cedure section 580b barred any recovery. [1] We agree wi1 
plaintiffs' contention that section 580b does not bar recovel 
in this case. 
Plaintiffs are real estate brokers who acted for both parti, 
in the negotiation of an exchange of an apartment buildir 
owned by defendants for two unimproved lots owned by tJ 
Agajanian Investment Corporation and Santa Anita Inve~ 
ments, Inc. The exchange agreement was executed.on June 2 
1965. The parties valued the apartment building at $188,~ 
and the two lots at $350,000. To compensate for ~he differen 
in value, defendants executed a note for $144,500 ~ecured by 
first deed of trust on one of the lots in favor of Santa Ani 
and a second note for $17,500 secured by a second deed 
trust on the same lot in favor of plaintiffs. The other lot w 
unencumbered. 
Each party tt) the exchange agreed to pay plaintiffs a COl 
mission of 5 percent of the value of its property. Defendar 
paid in cash the commission they owed plaintiffs. In lieu o:f 
cash payment of the commission owed by Agajanian 8J 
Santa. Anita, plaintiffs accepted defendants'· note for $17,5 
secured by the second deed of trust. The amount owed . 
defendants to Agajanian and Santa Anita was correspOll 
ingly reduced. In effect, defendants borrowed the amount 
the $17,500 commission from plaintiffs and used it as part 
the purchase price. The facts thus parallel those in Bargi( 
v. Hill (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 121 [28 Cal.Rptr. 321, 378 P. 
593]. 
In the Bargioni case we held that when the price 
property is reduced by the. amount of the commission 1 
seller owes to the broker and the buyer executes a nl 
secured by a second deed of trust to the broker for the arnOt 
of the commission, the broker is a third-party lender of p' 
chase money. Accordingly, we concluded that section 580b 
it then read precluded a deficiency judgment in favor of 1 
broker after the security }md been exhausted by a sale unc 
the first deed of trust. (See also Brown v. Jensen (1953) 
Ca1.2d 193, 197-198 [259 P.2d 425].) 
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After the Bargioni case was decided, the Legislature 
amended section 580b. It now provides: "No deficiency judg-
ment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for 
failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or 
under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to tlte vendor to 
secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real 
property, or under'a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling 
for not more than four families given to a lender to secure 
, repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part 
of the purchase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in 
part, by the purchaser." (Italicized parts added by 1963 
amendment. ) 
The amendment limits the protection given vendees against 
.Donvendor purchase money lenders to vendees of defined resi-
dential property. 'Since the property in this case is unim-
proved commercial property, section 580b no longer precludes 
third-party lenders of purchase money for such property from 
obtaining a deficiency judgment. 
Defendants contend, however, that even if plaintiffs are Dot 
precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment as lenders, 
they are also vendors within the meaning of section 580b and 
are therefore barred from recovering a deficiency judgment 
regardless of the character of the property involved. Defend-
. ants point out that the Dote and deed of trust plaintiffs 
accepted was given to discharge .Agajanian's and Santa 
Anita's obligation as \'endors and they conclude that there-
fore it must be deemed to be a note and deed of trust given to 
the vendors. To hold otherwise, they contend, will open the 
door to evasion of the protection that section 580b was enacted 
to provide. 
The answer to this contention is that under the plain 
language of the 1963 amendment to section 580b plaintiffs are 
,lenders and Dot vendors. [2]· That amendment expressly dis-
tinguishes between It'nders of purchase mont'y and vendors and 
contemplates that the parties to a saie of real property, other 
than the defined residential property, may freely elect to 
arrange for the financing of the purchase price in ways that 
may wholly or in part limit the vendee's protection from 
deficiency judgments. If the parties wish to afford fu]} protec-
tion to the vendee, they may provide that all security instru-
ments be given to the vendor, in which case subsequent 
assignees from the vendor would take subject to section 580b. 
If the vendor is not willing to accept such extensive risks, 
however, he may insist that all or part of the purchase price 
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be financed by third parties, whose remedies are not affected 
by section 580b. Moreover, in such a case it is immaterial 
whether the third party who assists in the financing makes a 
. payment of part of the price to the vendor' in exchange for the 
vendee's note and deed of trust or, as in this case, discharges 
an existing obligation of the vendor in exchange' for the 
vendee's note and deed of trust. (Bargioni v. Hill, supra, 59 
Ca1.2d 121, 123-124.) 
The parties could have chosen another method for the pay-
ment of plaintiffs' commission that would have afforded 
defendants the protection of section 580b. Thus, defendants 
could have given the note and deed of trust to Agajanian and 
Santa Anita with the understanding that they would in turn 
assign them to plaintiffs and guarantee payment. Such a 
transaction, however, would have been substantially different 
from the one the parties entered into, for it would have 
afforded defendants protection against a deficiency judgment 
at the risk of Agajanian, Santa Anita, and plaintiffs. It is 
reasonable to assume that had defendants bargained for the 
protection of section 580b' with respect to plaintiffs' note and 
deed of trust, they would have given some quid pro quo. 
Since the note and deed of trust for plaintiffs' commission 
was given by defendants, not to a vendor but to a iliird-party 
lender of purchase money for commercial property, defend-
ants are precluded by the express terms of the 1963 amend-
ment to section 580b from invoking the protection of that 
section against a deficiency judgment. 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
